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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STAT'E OF UTAH 




pANY, L. H. HEISELT and 
ANNIE RAY HEISELT, Admin-






The Order of the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, made and entered on June 28, 
1954, was that the "judgment entered in the above 
entitled case on the 15th day of J nne, 1948, be and t:Q.e 
same hereby is, permanently stayed and that execution 
shall not be issued upon the judgment herein rendered 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, L. H. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was originally commenced on June 9, 
1943, as a foreclosure proceeding on a real estate mort-
gage and note on which L. H. Heiselt was an endorser. 
The note was dated ~lay 15, 1936, and was in the amount 
of $3,000.00. L. H. Heiselt filed an answer and cross-
complaint in which he prayed for affirmative relief in 
the form of a partnership accounting. This case was 
tried and judgment was entered against L. H. Heiselt 
personally on June 19, 1948, for $3,000.00 with $1,798.75 
interest, $300.00 attorneys' fee and costs. ( R. P. 1, 2.) 
Defendant, L. H. Heiselt, appealed to the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah, which appeal resulted in the judg-
ment of the District Court being affirmed. The opinion 
of the Court is found in 116 Utah 83, 208 P. 2d 945, Upton 
vs. H eiselt Construction Company. At no time ~id L. H. 
Heiselt plead or attempt to prove that he had been 
adjudicated a bankrupt in proceedings in the State of 
Colorado. 
The defendant, L. H. Heiselt, died on March 27, 1951, 
in the State of Colorado. (R. P. 18.) Annie Ray Heiselt, 
wife of L. H. Heiselt, deceased, filed and qualified as 
administratrix in the domiciliary probate proceedings in 
Conejos County, State of Colorado, in July or August, 
1951. (R. P. 18.) 
That the plaintiff, A. E. Upton, herein duly filed 
with the County Court of Conejos County, Colorado, in 
probate in the Estate of L. H. Heiselt, deceased, the 
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claim based on the judgment issued in his favor in this 
case. (R. P. 21, 41.) The claim was denied by the ad-
ministratrix. (R. P. 22.) The question of allowance of 
the claim or disallowance of the claim in the probate 
proceedings in Conejos County, Colorado, has not been 
decided. ( R. P. 22, 40, 44.) 
On the 24th day of September, 1952, Annie Ray 
Heiselt as administratrix of the Colorado Estate of L. H. 
Heiselt, filed a petition with the Third Judicial District 
Court of the State of Utah, asking the court to stay 
execution on the judgment heretofore entered by the 
said Third Judicial District Court against L. H. Heiselt 
and which judgment was affirmed by this court. (R. P. 
9.) Objection was raised that the Colorado administra-
trix was not qualified to appear before the Utah Court 
which objection was granted and the motion was denied. 
(R. P. 10, 11.) Thereafter, Annie Ray Heiselt instituted 
ancillary probate proceedings in the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court for the State of Utah, and on March 25, 1953, 
was appointed ancillary administratrix by the Utah 
Court. ( R. P. 12, 36, 37.) She moved the Third Judicial 
District Court to substitute her as administratrix of 
the Estate of L. H. Heiselt, deeeased, as defendant in 
the above entitled matter, which motion was allowed. 
(R. P. 12, 13, 41.) Thereafter, the substituted defendant, 
Annie Ray Heiselt as administratrix, moved the Third 
Judicial District Court for a permanent stay of execu-
tion against the judgment made and entered against the 
said L. H. Heiselt in this case. (R. P. 12, 13.) 
The defendant introduced in evidence a ''Discharge 
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in Bankruptcy,'' from the Bankruptcy Court for the State 
of Colorado, dated the 14th day of January, 1949, of his 
scheduled allowable and provable debts under Section 
75 (s) of the Bankruptcy Act. (Ex. No.2.) It is claimed 
by the defendant that the Discharge bars recovery on 
the judgment by A. E. Upton. 
It was stipulated that the testimony of Annie Ray 
Heiselt given at the original hearing when she attempted 
to appear in the Utah Court as the Colorado administra-
trix, be allowed as evidence in the new hearing. (R. P. 
41, 42.) After argument and the submission of docu-
mentary evidence, the appellant herein requested addi-
tional time from the court to obtain from the Bankruptcy 
Court of .the State of Colorado, certified copies of the 
. 
bankruptcy schedules. These schedules were introduced 
in evidence which showed that the judgment involved in 
this case was not scheduled. (Ex. lA.) Additional time 
was then requested by the defendant herein to obtain 
further documentary evidence from the bankruptcy :files 
which additional time was allowed by· the court. There-
after, upon a further hearing and argument before the 
District Court, additional time was granted so that the 
plaintiff could take the deposition of A. E. Upton and 
the substituted defendant could take the deposition of 
Rafael J. Moses and Ernest Upton, all of whom are 
residents of the State of Colorado. (R. P. 46, 47.) 
Thereafter, a further hearing was held and the Third 
Judicial District Court made and entered its order dated 
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the 28th day of June, 1954, granting the motion for stay 
of execution on the judgment. (R. P. 74, 75.) 
I.J. H. Heiselt filed his original petition in bankruptcy 
in the United States District Court for the District of 
·Colorado, on October 23, 1940, under Section 75 ( a-r) of 
the Bankruptcy Act, which resulted in the failure of the 
creditors to reach an agreement. (Ex. 2A Sheet (16)). 
On July 7, 1941, he was adjudicated a bankrupt under 
Section 75 (s) of the Bankruptcy Act. (Ex. A P. 9.) 
L. H. Heiselt did not schedule with the Bankruptcy Court, 
his obliga.tion as an endorser on the note of May 15, 1936, 
upon 'vhich note the judgment in this case was entered. 
(Ex. 1A.) There appears on the schedule of debts of 
the bankrupt a debt of $30.00 owed by the bankrupt 
debtor to the plaintiff, A. E. Upton. There also appears 
on the schedule a debt owed by the bankrupt to the N a-
tiona! City Bank of Denver, a Colorado Corporation of 
which A. E. Upton was President. (Ex. 1A.) 
On November 16, 1940, the Conciliation Commission-
er in Bankruptcy at Saguache, Colorado, issued the 
"Notice of the First Meeting of Creditors", setting the 
first date of the first meeting of creditors as December 
21, 1941. (Ex. D, Sheet ( 4)). There was a re-reference 
of the said bankruptcy matter by the United States Dis-
trict Judge from the Conciliation Commissioner in Sa-
guache, Colorado, to Conciliation Commissioner, Hugh 
A. Crawford at Alamosa, Colorado. (Ex. D, P.1.) There-
after, the Conciliation Commissioner on March 8, 1941, 
issued a ''Notice of the First Meeting of Creditors under 
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Section 75.'' On March 17, 1941, the Conciliation Com-
missioner at Alamosa, Colorado, issued a ''Notice of the 
First Meeting of Creditors under Section 75.'' In the 
aforesaid notice of March 8, 1941, the date of the meeting 
\Vas de signa ted as March 17, 1941. In the said notice of 
March 17, 1941, the date of the meeting was March 29, 
1941. The first meeting of creditors was held on the said 
dates, March 17, 1941, and March 29, 1941. (Ex. D, P. 1.) 
A. E. Upton claims that he did not receive any of the 
notices. (Ex. 4A, P. 7.) (Ex. 7A, Sheet (4).) 
The name and address of A. E. Upton and a descrip-
tion of the $30.00 item did not appear in the list required 
under Section 75 (e) Bankruptcy Act to be attached to 
the ''Notice of First Meeting of Creditors'' issued on 
November 16, 1940. (Ex. 5A, P. 4, 5.) 
The bankruptcy proceedings show that a creditors 
meeting held in Alamosa, Colorado, on ~larch 29, 1941, 
that Rafael J. Moses, Attorney of Alamosa, entered an 
appearance for A. E. Upton. (Ex. 7 A, Sheets 1, 2, 3.) A. 
E. Upton denies that the appearance was made and denies 
that the_ said Rafael J. Moses was ever given authority 
to represent him at the proceedings. (Ex. 4A, P. 6, 7.) 
A. E. Upton was residing in California and away 
from his home and office in Denver, Colorado, from Janu-
ary 1941, to the latter part of May, 1941. (Ex. 4A, P. 7, 8.) 
On October 28, 1947, the defendant, L. H. Heiselt, 
petitioned the Bankruptcy Court to require the plaintiff, 
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.A.. E. Upton, to account to L. H. Heiselt for certain 
alleged transactions, 'vhich petition contained the same 
facts and parties set forth in the defendant's, L. H. Hei-
selt 's, answer, cross-complaint and counter-claim filed 
in this action. (Ex. 2A, Sheets 16 to 21 inc.) That said 
defendant, L. H. Heiselt, also instituted an action in the 
District Court in and for the City and County of Denver, 
State of Colorado, involving the same facts and parties 
set forth iu his answer, cross-complaint and counter-
claim filed in this action. (Ex. 2A, Sheets 22, 23.) On 
November 13, 1947, the plaintiff herein ans,vered the said 
petition of L. H. Heiselt of October 28, 1947, in the 
bankruptcy proceedings by a motion to dismiss said 
petition. (Ex. 2A, Sheets 22, 23.) On March 15, 1948, 
the Conciliation Commissioner, Frank McClaughlin, is-
sued ''Findings and Decision on Motion of A. E. Upton 
to Dismiss the Petition of the Debtor asking for Certain 
Relief in Relation to Property in the State of Utah;" 
and that the Consilia tion Commissioner ruled that the 
stay proceedings under Bankruptcy Act Section 75, had 
expired, that the plaintiff, A. E. Upton, had not violated 
the ''Stay Order'' through any of his actions in the Utah 
Courts and that the Utah Court's jurisdiction had at-
tached, and he therefore denied the petition of the bank-
rupt debtor. (Ex. 4.) 
On January 14, 1949, L. H. Heiselt was g1ven a 
Discharge in Bankruptcy of his scheduled and provable 
debts. The Obligation on which the judgment in this 
case is based was not among the scheduled debts. 
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On March 6, 1951, L. H. Heiselt petitioned the Colo-
rado F~deral Bankruptcy Court to reopen the bankruptcy 
proceedings for consideration of the matter now before 
this court and, another Utah case involving the same 
parties. (Ex. 3A, Sheets 1 to 5 inc.) The Federal Bank-
ruptcy Court of Colorado, after a hearing, referred the 
matter to the Conciliation Commission for ~earing and 
report and decision. (Ex. 3A, Sheet 7.) Thereafter, by 
stipulation of all parties the two cases of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Utah, 
No. 84208, which was the subject .matter mentioned in 
the said petition, and No. 70573, the subject matter of 
the case here at bar, were both to be considered by the 
Conciliation Commissioner (Ex. A, P. 45) and reported 
to the Federal District Court Judge and that in said 
consideration, certified copies of the pleadings in both 
cases, to-wit: Third District Court of the State of Utah, 
cases 70573 and 84208 were filed with the Conciliation 
Commissioner. (E~. 3A, Sheets 9 to 35 inc.) The petition 
of the bankrupt debtor, L. H. Heiselt, to reopen was 
denied. (Ex. A.) A report was made to Judge Knous 
of the United States District Court in and for the State 
-of Colorado. Thereafter, and after the time of appeal 
from said order, Judge Knous issued an order affirming 
the report and decision of the Conciliation Commissioner. 
(Ex. 's A and B.) The defendant, L. H. Heiselt, did not 
appeal from the said decisions and orders. The action 
aforesaid numbered 84208 of the Third District Court, 
in favor of plaintiff, A. E. Upton, was appealed to the 
Utah State Supreme Court -and affirmed by the Supreme 
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Court and is reported in 223 P. 2d 428; that the judgment 
in the case 70573 in favor of plaintiff, A. E. Upton vs. 
L. H. H eiselt personally, 'vas appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court and affirmed and is reported in 116 Utah 
83, 208 P. 2d 945. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
A. THE COLORADO PROBATE COURT HAS JUR-
ISDICTION AS IT ATTACHED PRIOR TO TI-lE 
PETITION TO STAY EXECUTION ON THE 
JUDGMENT AND THE UTAH COURT ERRED 
IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION. 
B. THE CONTROVERSY IS RES ADJUDICATA. 
1-The Judgment of the Utah Supreme Court is 
Final. 
2-Relief Denied Defendant by Colora.do Bankruptcy 
Court, And Its Decisions Are Final. 
C. F AlLURE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT L. 
H. HEISEL.T TO SCHEDULE DEBT OWING 
CREDITOR, IS FATAL TO HIS MOTION TO 
STAY EXECUTION IN THE ABSENCE OF 
NOTICE OR ACTUAL l(NOWLEDGE. 
1-The Debt Was Not Scheduled. 
2-A. E. Upton Did Not Receive Notice or Actua;l 
Knowledge of the Proceedings in Bankruptcy in 
T~me to Allow Him to Present His Claim. 
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(a) He Did Not Receive a· Notice From the Court. 
(b) He Did Not Atttthorize Rafael J. Moses to 
Represent Him at the Creditors Jtleetin.g. 
(c) A. E. Upton Did Not Receive .Actual Knowl-
edge of the Bankruptcy Proceedings From 
.Any Source in Time in Which to Perfect His 
Claim. 
D. THE DEBT UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT IS 
BASED WAS NOT A PROVABLE DEBT IN 
BANKRUPTCY WHEN BANKRUPTCY WAS 
INSTITUTED. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE COLORADO PROBATE COURT HAS JUR-
ISDICTION AS IT ATTACHED PRIOR TO THE 
PETITION TO STAY EXECUTION ON THE 
JUDGMENT AND THE UTAH COURT ERRED 
IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION. 
After L. H. Heiselt died on March 27, 1951, his 
Estate \vas filed for probate in the County Court of 
Conejos County, State of Colorado. Annie Ray Heiselt, 
his wife, was appointed and qualified as administratrix 
for the administration of the Estate on August 6, 1951. 
(Ex. 1.) The plaintiff, A. E. Upton, was therefore forced 
to file his claim based on the money judgment herein in 
the said Conejos County probate proceedings or lose his 
claim. A. E. Upton, therefore, duly filed his claim in that 
10 
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proceeding and in due course the said administratrix 
filed a disallo,vance thereof. (R .. P. 20, 21, 22, 40, 41, 43.) 
Thereafter, and on September 22, 1952, Annie Ray 
Heisel t as the said administratrix in the Colorado pro-
ceedings, filed a motion in the case at bar to be substituted 
as defendant in this case for the purpose of making a 
motion to stay execution on the judgment by A. E. Upton, 
the judgment creditor hereon. (R. P. 9.) The District 
Court in this case, disallowed this motion. (R. P. 10.) 
Thereafter, on March 27, 1953, said Annie Ray Heiselt 
as said ancillary administratrix moved the court in this 
case to be substituted as defendant in the place of L. H. 
Heiselt and this motion was allowed (R. P. 16) and also 
a motion of Annie Ray Heiselt to have the execution of 
said judgment permanently stayed on the ground of a 
discharge in bankruptcy issuing out of the District Court 
of the United States in and for the State of Colorado, 
was filed herein. 
The jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court 
of Utah, on the substituted defendant's Motion to Stay 
Execution was resisted by the plaintiff through a motion 
to strike on the ground that the Conejos County Probate 
Court had previously acquired and assumed jurisdiction 
of the subject matter. (R. P. 15.) 
The claim filed by the plaintiff based on the said 
money judgment is still before the County Court of 
Conejos County, Colorado, for decision. (R. P. 21, 22, 
37, 40, 44.) 
11 
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It is contended that the County Court of Conejos 
County, Colorado, has jurisdiction and tha.t the Third 
Judicial District Court of Utah, was in error in assuming 
jurisdiction under the Motion to Stay Execution, and 
disallowing the motion to strike .. 
It is submitted that the County Court of Conejos 
County, Colorado, is a court of competent jurisdiction to 
decide the validity of the claim of A. E. Upton against 
the Estate of L. H. Heiselt, deceased, on the final money 
judgment he obtained against L. H. Heiselt issuing out 
of the Third Judicial District Court in and for the State 
of Utah, and to decide any and all defenses thereto, sub-
ject only to the appellate authority from the said Colo-
rado Court. Also, it is submitted that the said Colorado 
\Court took cognizance of the matter of the Estate of L. H. 
Heiselt, deceased, prior to the filing of the motion by 
Annie Ray Heiselt in the matter now before this court. 
Also, it is submitted that' the said Colorado Court has 
jurisdiction and power to afford complete relief and has 
the exclusive right to dispose of the controversy in re-
spect to the claim of A. E. Upton based on the Utah judg-
ment filed in the said Colorado Court. (Colorado National 
Bank vs. JJfcCue, 249 Pac. 3, 5; 80 Colo. 55) cited below, 
page 16 of this brief. Also, it is submitted that the actions 
in the said Colorado Court and the court herein on the 
' 
said claim of A. E. Upton are between the same parties, 
to-wit: A. E. Upton and L. H. Heiselt, through Annie 
Ray Heiselt, as administratrix of the Estate of L. H. 
Heiselt and substituted as defendant for L. H. Heiselt 
12 
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on the matter now before this court; that said actions 
are on the same subject, and to test the same rights. 
There is nothing in the evidence or questions in the 
Motion instituted in the Utah District Court on Septem-
ber 22, 1952 by Annie Ray Heiselt that is not before the 
Probate Court in Colorado, and that could not be decided 
by the Colorado Court. In any event, it is contended 
that the court administering the Estate is the proper 
court to decide the claim and defenses thereto and not 
the Utah District Court in the case at bar in these sup-
plemental motions. 
After the death of L. H. H eiselt, the judgment 
creditor, A. E. Upton, could not have obtained execution 
on. the judgment any place except where the probate pro-
ceedings of L. H. Heiselt's Estate wa.s instituted to-wit: 
County Court of Conejos County, Colorado. Therefore, 
any move by A. E. Upton to get satisfaction on his judg-
ment against L. H. Heiselt in any other court, would have 
rightly been resisted and A. E. Upton would have been 
required to get satisfaction on his judgment by filing in 
the County Court of Conejos County, Colorado, and there 
he duly filed his claim against the Estate of L. H. Heiselt. 
(R. P. 20, 21, 40, 41, 43.) 
There has never been any attempt by the judgment 
creditor, A. E. Upton, since the death of L. H. Heiselt, 
to get execution on his judgment in a Utah Court. 
Assume that A. E. Upton had not filed his judgment claim 
in the County Court of Conejos County in the matter of 
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L. H. Heiselt, deceased, in due time, the administratrix 
would not have filed the motion she did in this court and 
which is now here on appeal. Then the judgment creditor, 
A. E. Upton, would have lost his remedy and any satis-
faction on the judgm.ent. 
Under the rule of comity, the administratrix should 
not be allo,ved to switch about to other courts at the 
expense and inconvenience of creditors, especially when 
the creditors have gone to the expense and inconvenience 
of filing their claims in the court the statute designates 
as the proper court for the determination of the question 
of claims against the Estate, and in which court the 
Estate was and is filed for administration. 
The fact that the administratrix filed and qualified 
in the probate court in Colorado is an admission of that 
court's jurisdiction over the administration of the de-
ceased's Estate. 
If there is any question of the jurisdiction of the 
Colorado County Court it may be resolved by reference 
to Oolorado Statutes Annotated, 1935, Vol. 2, Chap. 46, 
Sections 120-198, and the Colorado case cited below, Colo-
rado Nation.al Bank vs. McCue, page 16 of this brief. 
The following authorities support the point, 21 
C.J.S.~ Page 745 et sequa, Par. 492. 
"Priority and Retention of Jurisdiction: 
That court which first takes cognizance of an 
action over which it. has jurisdiction and power to 
afford complete r~l1ef has the exclusive right to 
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dispose of the controversy without interference 
from other courts of concurrent jurisdiction in 
\vhich similar actions are subsequently instituted 
bet,veen the same parties seeking similar remedies 
and involving the same questions. 
''Where t'vo actions between the same parties, 
on the same subject, and to test the same rights, 
are brought in different courts having concurrent 
jurisdiction, the court which first acquired juris-
diction, its power being adequate to the adminis-
tration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction 
and may dispose of the whole controversy, and no 
court of coordinate power is at liberty to interfere 
'vith its action. This rule rests on comity and the 
necessity of a voiding conflict in the execution of 
judgments by independent courts, and is a neces-
sary one because any other rule would unavoidably 
lead to perpetual collision and be productive of 
most calamitous results. 
''The rule has been applied to proceedings in 
different courts of concurrent probate jurisdiction, 
and likewise to proceedings in a probate court, and 
a court of equity, where the probate court has 
assumed jurisdiction and nothing intervenes to 
render such jurisdiction inadequate, and also 
generally where a probate court and some other 
state cottrt have concurrent jurisdiction of a par-
ticular matter or proceeding. (Italics ours.) 
14 Am. J-ur., P. 435, Courts, Par. 243. 
"Generally.-The principle is essential to the 
proper and orderly administration of the laws; 
and while its observance might be required on the 
grounds of judicia.Z comity and courtesy, it does 
n.ot rest upon such considerations exclusively, but 
is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and 
da;ngerous conflicts of jurisdiction arnd of process. 
15 
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If interference ttnay come from one side, it may 
from the other also, and what is begun may be 
reciproca.ted ,indefinitely" (Italics ours.) 
Par. 243, N. 18 reads : 
"Courts must be cautious when dealing with a 
conflict of jurisdiction. Metcalf Bros. v. Barker, 
187 U.S. 165, 47 L.Ed. 122, 23 S.Ct. 67." (Italics 
ours.) 
See also 14 Am. J ur., Courts, Sec. 245, P. 437. 
lJ!letcalf v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165, 175; 47 L. Ed. 125, 
32 S. Ct. 67. 
'' . . . and Mr. Justice Grier said : It is a doc-
trine of law too long established to require a 
citation of authorities, that, where a court has 
jurisdiction, it has a right to decide every ques-
tion which occurs in the cause, and whether its 
decision be correct or otherwise, its judgment, till 
reversed, is regarded a.s binding in. every other 
court; a.nd that, where the jurisdiction of a court, 
a.nd the right of a, plaintiff to prosecute his suit 
in it, have once · attached, that right cannot be 
arrested or taken away by proceedings in a;nother 
court. These rules have· their foundation, not 
merely in ·comity, but on necessity. For if one 
may enjoin, the other may retort by injunction, 
and thus the parties be without remedy; being 
liable to a proc~ss for contempt in one, if they 
dare to proceed In the other ... '' (Italics ours.) 
Colo. Nat. Bank v. McCue, 249 Pac. 3, 5, 80 Colo. 55. 
''The county court has jurisdiction to pass 
upon the plaintiff's claim filed therein and is as 
competent as the district court to det~rmine the 
16 
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validity of the property settlement contract. 
Aside from this, the county court is the court 
which has sole jurisdiction to pass upon the valid-
ity of claims against an estate during the process 
of administration, and has the sole power to 
classify the various allowed claims against the 
estate into their proper division.'' 
Cole vs. Franklin Life Ins. Co., C.C.A. Texas, 93 F. 
2d 620, 624. 
''From the earliest days a statutory adminis-
tration upon the estate of a deceased person in 
Texas has been regarded as comprehensive and 
all-embracing. From the earliest days it has been 
continuously held that an administration begun 
within the statutory limit draws to it exclusive 
disposition of the entire estate of the deceased, 
including all claims against it, and all those in 
its favor. Under these authorities, where there 
is an administration in the probate court, it is 
only through the court that claims, secured or 
unsecured, may be established and realized upon.'' 
After said judgment and appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Utah, the defendant died and the administra-
tion of his Estate was duly and properly filed in the 
County Court of Conejos County, Colorado, and the 
judgment creditor, A. E. Upton, (Plaintiff appellant 
herein) duly filed his claim based on said judgment in 
the said probate proceedings in the Conejos County 
Court and the administratrix duly entered disallowance 
thereof and the decision on the said claim is still before 
that court. Therefore, the Conejos County Court in 
Colorado acquired full and complete jurisdiction of the 
matter of the validity of the Claim of A. E. Upton based 
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on the said judgment against the Estate of L. H. Heiselt 
and that court is fully competent to adjudicate all ques-
tions thereon. The administratrix in that matter, who 
is the substituted defendant appellee now before this 
court, could have and still can present to the County 
Court of Conejos County any and all of the defenses she 
has presented in the matter which she has presented 
under her motio11 in the matter now before this court. 
Further, she has the right of appeal from the Colorado 
Court as likewise does the judgment creditor, A. E. 
Upton. 
It is noted that this defendant, L. H. Heiselt, during 
the litigation of this case, has on three occasions, to-wit: 
On October 28, 1947, before the Bankruptcy Court (Ex. 
2A, Sheets 16 to 21 inc.), on December 2, 1946, before 
the District Court, City & County of Denver, Colorado, 
(Ex. 2A, Sheet 23) and on March 6, 1951, before the 
Bankruptcy Court (Ex. 3A) attempted to have these said 
courts take conflicting jurisdiction of the very same liti-
gation as in the case now before this court. Those courts 
in each instance under the rules of the doctrine of comity 
have stated that the Utah Court, prior to the judgment 
in the Utah District Court on June 7th, 1948, and the 
appeal from that judgment to the Utah Supreme Court 
(116 Utah· 83, 208 P. 2d 945), had acquired jurisdiction 
over the matter and each time the above courts refused 
to assume conflicting jurisdiction in the rna tter. 
It is submitted that the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District in and for the State of Utah, in the 
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matter of the substituted defendant's motion now before 
this court should have ruled that prior jurisdiction over 
the matter had previously been acquired, recognized and 
assumed by the Conejos County Court, and should have 
allowed the plaintiff's Motion to Strike and should not 
have taken any jurisdiction in the matter under the de-
fendant's lVIotion to Stay Execution. 
B. THE CONTROVERS-Y IS RES ADJUDICATA. 
1-The Judgment of the Utah Supreme Court is 
Final. 
The action upon which the judgment involved in 
this case and on which the lower court stayed execution, 
was commenced in the Third District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County on June 9, 1943. The action 'vas against 
the Heiselt Construction Company and L. H. Heiselt 
whose administratrix is the defendant herein. The case 
did not come before the court for trial until June, 1948, 
and on June 7, 1948, judgment 'vas entered against L. H. 
Heiselt personally, due to the fact that he was an en-
dorser on a note which was secured by a mortgage of 
real property. Thereafter, the case was appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court with the result that the judgment 
of the District Court was affirmed. Upton vs. H eiselt 
Construction Company, 116 Utah 83, 208 P. 2d 945. 
L. H. Heiselt filed a Petition in Bankruptcy in the 
United States District Court in and for the State of 
Colorado, on the 21st day of October, 1940, under Section 
75, Subdivision ( a-r) of Section 75 of the Bankruptcy 
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Act, and he amended his petition so that he might come 
under Section 75 (s). This was done on July 7, 1941. The 
Automatic Stay Order issued under Subdivision (a-r) 
of Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, terminated on July 
7, 1941, when the debtor amended his petition to come 
under Subdivision (s) of Section 75. (Ex. A, P. 9.) 
On September 12, 1941, a judicial three year Stay 
Order was issued by virtue of adjudication under 75 (s) 
of the Bankruptcy Act. This judicial Stay Order expired 
on September 13, 1944. (Ex. A, P. 11.) 
As heretofore mentioned, the action herein against 
Heiselt was commenced on June 9, 1943, which was within 
the period of the judicial Stay Order of September 12, 
1941. The defendant, L. H. Heiselt, answered the com-
plaint of the plaintiff herein, A. E. Upton, and at the 
same time filed a counter-claim asking for affirmative 
relief. He did not plead the bankruptcy proceedings in 
his answer. (Ex. 3A, Sheets 13 to 16 inc.) 
The law is clear that in order for the bankrupt to 
take advantage of a Stay Order, it must be pleaded 
specially as a defense to the action. 6 Am. Jur. (Ba;nk-
ruptcy), Par. 319: 
''An application to a state court for a stay of 
a pending action against a bankrupt to which the 
bankrupt is entitled under Sec. 11 (a) (11 U.S.C.A. 
Sec. 29 (a), F.C.A. Title 11 Sec. 29 (a) is made 
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Thereafter, when the case was brought up for trial 
in 1948, the fact that L. H. Heiselt was before the Bank-
ruptcy Court in the State of Colorado, was never pre-
sented to the trial court nor was it presented to the 
Supreme Court of Utah. The District Court was allowed 
to enter judgment against Heiselt and the Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment, which judgment became final. At 
no time during the pendency of the appeal did L. H. 
Heiselt either seek to have the District Court request a 
remanding of the case so that it might entertain a motion 
to vacate its judgment or to ask leave to amend the 
complaint and raise the issue of bankruptcy. At no time 
during the pendency of the appeal did L. H. Heiselt ask 
this court to dismiss the appeal so as to restore juris-
diction to the District Court under which it could enter-
tain a motion to vacate its judgment and for leave to 
amend the complaint. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah was 
handed down on July 13, 1949. The alleged bar of the 
bankruptcy proceedings in the State of Colorado was 
not raised before the Utah Courts until 1951. (R. P. 
4, 5, 6, 7.) 
It is elemental that a discharge in bankruptcy must 
be pleaded in order to be a defense, H el1ns vs. Holmes 
(C.A. 4th), 129 F. 2d 263, 141 A.L.R. 1367. 
Although it is admitted that at the time the judgment 
was obtained in this case, L. H. Heiselt had not yet been 
given his discharge as a bankrupt; however, he had 
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pre~riously been adjudicated a bankrupt on J nly 7, 1941. 
(Ex. A, P. 9.) In view of the fact that he had been adju-
dicated a bankrupt, the Utah Court should have been so 
advised if the subsequent defense of a discharge in 
bankruptcy was to be asserted. In 6 Am. Jur. (Bank-
ruptcy), Page 1025, we find the follo,ving statement: 
''The normal as well as the safe practice on the 
p·a.rt of a. defendant in an action pending at the 
time he was adjudicated in bankruptcy is to ap-
pear, plead the pendency of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, and ask for a continuance or stay of 
the action until he can obtain and plead his dis-
charge.'' 
The question of the failure of a bankrupt to schedule 
his debt and his failure to plead the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings i11 a law action such as we have in this case, 
was discussed by the Mass. Court in Parker vs. 1l!lurphy, 
215 Mass. 72, 102 N.E. 85. 
In that case, the plaintiff asked for relief from a 
judgment secured by the defendant against him on the 
ground that the judgment was barred by the plaintiff's 
discharge in bankruptcy. An action in law on three 
promissory notes was brought by the defendant against 
the plaintiff. Thereafter, while the action was pending, 
the plaintiff, on appeal, after filing a petition in the 
Bankruptcy Court was adjudged a bankrupt. The fact 
·of bankruptcy was not called to the attention of the court 
nor pleaded in the law action. ,Judgment was entered in 
favor of the defendant against the plaintiff on the notes. 
Later, the plaintiff received his discharge in bankruptcy. 
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The plaintiff then asked for relief from the judgment. 
The court decided the ease against the bankrupt on the 
grounds that the bankrupt had not duly scheduled the 
obligation and that the creditor did not have notice or 
actual kno,vledge of the bankruptcy proceedings. How-
ever, in discussing the obligation of the bankrupt 1n 
reference to pleading the bankruptcy, the court said: 
''It is established that a "rrit of audita querela 
'vill not avail a complaining party who has a 
legal opportunity of defense, or when the alleged 
\Vrongful judgment from 'vhich he seeks release is 
attributable to his own neglect ... Nevertheless 
in the simple action at law upon a claim to which 
a discharge in bankruptcy "\\rould be a bar, ... the 
usual procedure is for the bankrupt to plead the 
pendency of the bankrupt proceedings and ask for 
a continuance until he can obtain and plead his 
discharge.'' 
See also Berry Clothing Co. 1.:s .. Shotnick, 249 Mass. 
459, 144 N.E. 392. 
In Woodruff v. Heiser, C.C.A. Okla. 1945, 150 Fed. 
2d 869, reversed on other grounds, Heiser v. W oodrtt/f, 
66 S. Ct. 853, 327 U. S. 726, 90 L. Ed. 970, at 976; re-
hearing denied 66 S. Ct~ 1335, 328 U. S. 879, 90. L. Ed. 
1647, it is held: 
"But we are aware of no principle of law or 
equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal 
court of the salutary principle of res adjudicata, 
which is founded upon the generally recognized 
public policy that there must be some end to liti-
gation and that when one appears in court to 
present his case, is fully heard, and the contested 
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issue is decided against him, he may not ~a~er 
renew the litigation in another court. (Citing 
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling ~len's Assn., 283 
U. S. 522, 525, 526; 75 L. Ed. 1244, 1246, 2147; 51 
S. Ct. 517 ... 
''This Court has also required that effect be 
given in both state and federal courts to a plea 
of res adjudicata arising from decrees of a bank-
rupt court. (Citing cases.) 
"And it is well settled that where the trustee 
in bankruptcy unsuccessfully litigates an issue 
outside the bankruptcy court the decision against 
him is binding on the bankruptcy court. (Citing 
) " cases ... 
In Re Redwine, D. C. Ala. 1944, 53 Fed. Supp. 249, 
55 Am. Bkrpt. Rep. N. S. 459, it is held that ''The doc-
trine of res adjudicata applies in bankruptcy proceed-
ings." 
If one substitutes 'bankrupt' for 'trustee in bank-
ruptcy' in the Heiser v. Woodruff case, supra, it is on 
all fours with the ease here in issue, because in the 
Heiselt bankruptcy proceedings under Section 7 5 ( s), 
the bankrupt paid out his creditors under his proposal 
within the three year stay period ending September 12, 
1944, (Ex. 4, P. 5) and there was no necessity for ap-
pointing a trustee in bankruptcy. In the cas~ at bar 
Heiselt, the farmer debtor bankrupt, went outside the 
bankruptcy court into another state (Utah) to litigate 
an issue unsuccessfully and in the matter of the petition 
filed in bankruptcy on October 28, 1947, (Ex. 2A, Sheets 
16 to 21 inc.) on the matter here in issue, the bankruptcy 
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court in its decision recognized the principle of res 
adjudicata; (Ex. 4) and like,vise in the Petition of the 
Debtor to Reopen in 1951, the bankruptcy repeated its 
recognition of the principle of res adjudicata. (Ex. A, 
P. 3A.) 
In the case now before this court, L. H. Heiselt filed 
an ans\ver and counter-claim to the complaint of the 
plaintiff, A. E. Upton, and in the counter-claim, asked 
for affirmative relief in the form of a partnership ac-
counting. (Ex. 3A, Sheets 13 to 16 inc.) It is clear that 
Heiselt chose not to assert his adjudication in bankruptcy 
but chose rather to proceed with his counter-claim and 
affirmative defense. It would be grossly unjust to allo"'" 
L·. H. Heiselt \vho failed to ask the court to grant him 
relief during the pendency of the action before the Dis-
trict Court on the grounds of his adjudication as a bank-
rupt because and for the reason that he had a counter-
claim against the plaintiff and then when he failed to 
prevail in his action on the counter-claim and a judgment 
was entered against him, allow him now to set up the 
discharge in bankruptcy over two years after the dis-
charge \vas granted. 
2-Relief Denied Defendwnt by Colorado Bankruptcy 
Cou.rt, And Its Decisions Are Final. 
On the 28th day of October, 1947, L. H. Heiselt filed 
a petition in the bankruptcy proceeding in the State of 
Colorado, requesting the Bankruptcy Court to adjudicate 
the matters involved in this Utah case, together with 
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other cases pending in Utah and Colorado State Courts, 
and for an order staying the proceedings in the State 
Courts. (Ex. 2A, Sheets 16 to 21 inc., and Ex. 4, P. 5.) 
The Bankruptcy Court denied L. H. Heiselt's. petition 
on the 15th day of March, 1948, and in the Ord~r of the 
Bankruptcy Court, the Court stated: 
''The facts do not warrant the making of any 
such adjudication, or the entering of any judgment 
in this proceeding. Bankruptcy Courts are not 
Trial Courts, and if they were, these controversies 
were pending in. other courts. ' ' (Ex. 4, P. 5.) 
This ruling in_ effect gave_ consent and authorization 
to the Utah. Court to proceed with the adjucation, and 
recognized that the jurisdiction of the Utah Court had 
attached. This ruling in effect showed that the matter 
involved in the Utah Court did not involve matters under 
the custody of the Bankruptcy Court. 
There was no appeal taken from the Order of the 
Bankruptcy Court within the 10 day statutory period. 
Thereafter, the Order of the United States District Court 
for the District of Colorado, was made and the Order 
became. final and res adjudicata as to the matters before 
the Bankruptcy Court. 
L. H. Heiselt was discharged in bankruptcy under 
Section 75 (s) on January 14, 1949. (Ex. 2.) On March 
6, 1951, L. H. Heiselt filed a petition to reopen the bank-
ruptcy proceedings for the purpose of administering 
matters involved in the Utah State Courts and to enjoin 
further proceedings by A. E. Upton. (Ex. 3A.) L. H. 
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I-Ieiselt died on March 27, 1951, and Annie Ray I-Ieiselt 
was appointed administratrix of the deceased's Estate 
in the State of Colorado. (Ex. 1.) 
On October 19, 1951, the petition which had been 
filed by the deceased on March 6, 1951, was called up 
before the Judge of the United States District Court at 
which time, Frank McGlaughlin was appointed Special 
Master to hear and report on the matters involved. (R,. 
P. 23, 26, 27, Ex. A.) 
The attorneys for the Estate of L. H. Heiselt and 
for A. E. Upton, were notified of the hearing to be held 
. . 
on December 10, 1951, before the Special Master in 
Denver, Colorado. It '\vas agreed between the parties 
that, ''The Special Master should consider the entire 
record in the case, together with certified copies of the 
Pleadings and Judgments in Utah cases," and the record 
of the case no'\v before this court fully considered, as 
appears from the report of the Special Master found at 
pages 4 and 5 of (Ex. A, Ex. 3A, 4, P. 23, 26, 27). 
It was argued by the attorneys for the Estate of 
L. H. Heiselt, that any state action involving property 
of the debtor was void because of claims prohibitions of 
the "Stay" features of the Bankruptcy Act. The Special 
Master's report came to the follo'\ving conclusion: 
CONCLUSION OF FACTS 
''It will be seen from the foregoing summary 
that the stay order was made after the debtor was 
adjudicated a bankrupt under Section 75s on July 
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7, 1941, and that that stay order expired ?n Sep-
tember 13, 1944. The Application of Sect~on 75n, 
o, and pas a statutory stay of proceedings expired 
on July 7 1941 when the debtor was adjudic.ated 
' ' a bankrupt under Section 75s, and as will be seen 
hereafter, this statutory stay did not extend be-
yond July 7, 1941. 
"The suit to quiet title was not filed until 
practically four years after the expiration of the 
stay order of September 12, 1941, and the final 
judgment quieting title to the real estate in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, was not entered until October, 
1949, or eight ( 8) years after the stay order. 
THE LAW OF THE CASE 
''The effect of stay orders is discussed by Cal-
lier On Ba;nkruptcy, 14th Edition, at Paragraph 
75.34 at page 216 of Volume 5. I quote from page 
216: 
'The stay of proceedings or moratorium p~o­
vided for in Section 75s(2) is, however, a judicial 
stay and not an automatic one. It is the debtor's 
responsibility to present his petition or applica-
tion for a stay to the court and see to it that it is 
properly brought to the court's attention. The 
moratorium period prescribed in Section 75s (2) 
will not begin to run until the entry of the stay 
order. As indicated in a previous discussion, the 
automatic stay engendered by Sec.tion 75 a-r pro-
ceedings expires once the debtor has been adjudi-
cated a bankrupt under Section 75s and has the 
opportunity to obtain a further stay. But if he 
~eglects to obtain a stay, non-bankruptcy proceed-
Ings completed before a stay order is granted will 
not be invalidated. 
'Once the matter is presented to the court and 
all the preliminary conditions, previously men-
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tioned, have been complied with, the debtor has 
an absolute right to the entry of an order staying 
all judicial or official proceedings in any court, 
or under the direction of any official, for a period 
of three years. * :J(: *' 
Reading from page 218: 
'The moratorium or stay period runs for a 
term of three years after the entry of the stay 
order. This term may neither be lengthened, nor 
may it be shortened, except in the manner pre-
scribed in subdivision s. Thus the duration of the 
stay is expressly conditioned to the extent pro-
vided in subdivision s ( 3) :r.· * *' 
''Under Section s ( 3), no stay is contemplated. 
I, therefore, conclude as follows: 
"That the respondent, Upton, has not violated 
any of the provisions of the stay order of Sep-
tember 12, 1941, which. expired September 12-13, 
1944, and that the reopening of the case would not 
benefit the debtor as a determination of his rights 
to the Utah property by tax deed or otherwise was 
not involved within the date of the stay order and 
·the recommendation to the Judge is that the 
application of the debtor to reopen the case should 
be denied.'' (Ex. A, P. 9, 10, 11.) 
No appeal from the findings of the Special Master 
was made to the District Court for the State of Colorado, 
within the ten-day period as required by la'v and there-
after William Lee Knous, Judge of the U. S. District 
Court, for the District of Colorado, signed an Order 
dated April 14, 1952, affirming the report and recom-
mendations of the Special Master. (Ex. B.) 
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It is appellant's contention that the judgment of 
the Utah Supreme Court is final; that defendant cannot 
no'v set up the discharge in bankruptcy after having 
failed to notify the court during the Utah proceedings 
that he had been adjudicated a bankrupt. And in addi-
tion thereto, it is clear that the Colorado Bankruptcy 
Court, althougp it had been petitioned twice, once before 
the discharge in bankruptcy and once after the discharge 
in bankruptcy, to allo'v L. H. Heiselt, the bankrupt debtor 
to reopen the bankruptey proeeedings for the purpose of 
including this judgment and the obligation on which it 
was founded refused to allow the reopening and thereby 
implied that L. H. Heiselt, by reason of his failure to 
schedule the indebtedness due the plaintiff was stopped 
from further procedure before the Bankruptcy Court, 
because the Utah Court's jurisdiction had attached. The 
Utah Court, thereafter rendered judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff, which judgment was affirmed on appeal. 
Therefore,. this matter then became res adjudicata. 
Justice Harlan in Johnston Steel Street Rail Co. vs. 
Wharton, 152 U. S. 252, 38 L. Ed. 429, 432, 14 S. Ct. 608 
said: 
"The objeet in establishing judieial tribunals 
is that controversies bet"~een parties, which may 
be the subjeet of litigation, shall be finally deter-
mined. The peace and order of society demand 
that matters distinetly put in issue and determined 
by a cou:t of competent jurisdiction as to parties 
and subJect matter, shall not be retried between 
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C. FAILURE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT L. 
H. HEISELT TO SCHEDULE DEBT OWING 
CREDITOR, IS FATAL TO HIS MOTION TO 
STAY EXECUTION IN THE ABSENCE OF 
NOTICE OR ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE. 
1-The Debt Was Not Scheduled. 
It was found by the trial court that the obligation 
upon which the judgment in this case was founded "ra.s 
not scheduled. Findings of Fact. (R. P. 70, Ex~ 1A.) 
The material part of the Bankruptcy .Act, 11 U. S. C. 
A., Section 35 is as follows : 
"(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release 
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether 
allowable in full or in part, except such as * ~: * 
(3) have not been duly scheduled in time for proof 
and allowance, with the name of the creditor, if 
known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had 
notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in 
bankruptcy * * * '' 
In ..t:1shbaugh v. Belan.ge1", 39 F. Supp. 401, 404, the 
court said: 
''To be discharged in bankruptcy from a debt, 
a petitioning bankrupt must exercise due and 
reasonable diligence to ascertain and properly 
schedule his creditors.'' 
L. H. Heiselt endorsed the note, upon which the 
judgment in this case was founded in 1936. It cannot 
be said that he exercised "due and reasonable diligenee" 
when he failed to schedule his obligation on the note, 
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assuming for the discussion of the point, that there was 
a provable debt which the plaintiff denies. 
Plaintiff contends that inasmuch as the obligation 
upon which the judgment in this case is founded 'vas not 
duly scheduled as required by the Statute, that the 
respondent cannot now assert the discharge in bank-
ruptcy as a bar to the appellant's recovering on his 
judgment. 
Not only did he fail to schedule his obligation as 
endorser on the note, but he later was given two oppor-
tunities by the Bankruptcy Court to inform the Bank-
ruptcy Court of his obligation to A. E. Upton, which he 
"\vholly failed to do. 
Attention is called to the fact that after reference 
of the bankruptcy proceeding to Mr. Frank M. Mc-
Laughlin, as referee in bankruptcy, at Denver, Colorado, 
from Mr .. Hugh E. Cra\vford, Cancellation Commission 
at Alamosa, Colorado. Mr. McLaughlin, on April 26, 
1943, issued an order to the bankrupt, part of which is 
as follows: 
''For the purpose of determining what orders 
should be made herein for the protection of the 
debtor and the debtor's creditors, the said debtor 
is hereby ordered and directed to furnish and file 
with the undersigned referee in bankruptcy, action 
as Conciliation Commissioner herein, the follow-
ing information, said information to be filed in 
the form of a written report, duly signed and 
verified by the debtor, on or before ten days from 
and after the date hereof. 
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'' (1) Furnish the following information rela-
tive to the stock, property and effects of the 
Heiselt Construction Company, owned by the 
bankrupt and his 'Yife at the time the petition was 
filed or acquired subsequent thereto, to-wit: 
SubdiYision (d) asked the questions: 
'' (d) What, if any, property which belonged 
to the Heiselt Construction Company at the time 
of the filing of the petition herein, on October 21, 
1940, has been sold or encumbered? If any, what 
amount was obtained therefor, and what disposi-
tion was made of the money? If mortgaged, to 
'vhom, and for 'vhat, and what amount, if any, has 
been paid? ' ' (Ex. 2A, Sheet 4.) 
The report of the debtor, L. H. Heiselt, in answer to 
the above mentioned order 'vas filed May 5, 1943. (Ex. 
2A, Sheets 7 to 15 inc.) A comparison of that report with 
the complaint, answers and cross-complaint filed in this 
action before the lo,ver court and the later petition of 
L. H. Heiselt on October 28, 1947, in bankruptcy (Ex. 
2A, Sheets 16 to 21), sho,vs that the debtor L. H. Heiselt 
did not fully and truthfully set forth the information 
requested in the order in that he did not state the amount 
of the mortgage, nor did he set out the mortgage, nor 
did he state to that court that he was an endorser of the 
note tvhich secured the r;nortgage. He, at that time, had 
full opportunity to bring before the Bankruptcy Court 
the obligation on which the judgment in this case is 
founded. This he utterly failed to do. 
Going next to the petition of October 28, 1947, (Ex. 
2A, Sheet 16) of the Bankruptcy Court by Mr. Mci.Jaugh-
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lin, (Ex. 4) attention is ealled to the fact that the debtor 
therein brought up the very same allegations that he 
included in his cross-complaint, in the case now before 
this court. The pleadings in this case are set out in full 
in Exhibit 3A commencing at sheet 9. 
The mortgage involved in this case is mentioned in 
Paragraph 12 of the October 28, 1947 petition. Para-
graph 13 of the petition sets forth the note. Particular 
attention is called to the fact that the debtor Haiselt 
omited to allege or set forth in the petition for the in-
formation of the Bankruptcy Court, that L. H. Heiselt 
personally endorsed and guaranteed the note upon which 
plaintiff's judgment is founded. (Ex. 2A, P. 16 to 21 
inc.) See. also (R. P. 50, 51). 
It is, therefore, readily apparent that the debtor 
Heiselt not only purposely and deliberately failed to 
schedule the debt upon 'vhich the judgment in this case 
is based, but on the two occasions mentioned immediately 
above, the debtor Heiselt intentionally, purposely and 
deliberately omitted including the information after 
having been ordered to do so by the Bankruptcy Court 
and at a later date, after suit had been commenced in 
this case, failed to include the information in his peti-
tion of October 28, 194 7. 
It cannot be logically contended by the defendant 
that L. H. Heiselt just overlooked this obligation in vie'v 
of the fact that the complaint in the case before this court 
was filed in 1943, and in that complaint, he was personally 
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charged as a defendant because of his endorsement of 
the said note which secured the mortgage and upon 
which endorsement the judgment involved in this case 
was entered against him personally. 
It is submitted that L. H. Heiselt failed to exercise 
"due and reasonable diligence to ascertain and properly 
schedule his creditors,'' Ashbaugh v. Belanger, supra. 
''The burden of proving that he did all things 
required of him under the bankruptcy law· to give 
notice to the respondant creditor of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings or that the latter had actual 
knowledge of them rests upon the plaintiff in this 
case. Wylie v. Masinopky, 201 Mass. 583, 88 N.E. 
448; Wineman v. Fisher, 135 Mich. 604, 608, 98 
N.W. 404.'' 
Parker vs. Murphy, 215 Mass. 72, 102 N.E. 85, 
87. 
2-A. E. Upton Did Not Recei1)e Notice or .flctual Kn.o~ol­
edge of the Proceedings in. Bankruptcy in Time to 
Allo~v Him to Present His Cla.im. 
(a) He Did Not Receive a Notice From the Court. 
At the outset, it should be noted that the btttrden of 
proving discharge in ba;nkruptcy is on the one who seeks 
to show that an obligation was dishonored in bankruptcy. 
The burden is not on one seeking to enforce the payment 
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The rule is stated in 6 .... -1m. J·u r., ( Ba'llkruptcy), Par. 
809 as follows: 
"The authorities are uniform that where a 
discharge in bankruptcy is pleaded as a defense 
to an action, and the plea is traversed, the burden 
is upon the defendant ultimately to prove his dis-
charge. What may appear to be a conflict in the 
cases on the burden of proof of a discharge in 
bankruptcy asserted as a defense to an action 
against the bankrupt is explained by the failure 
to differentiate between the burden of proof in 
the ultimate sense and in the sense of going for-
ward with the evidence at a particular stage in 
the case.'' 
Kobebell v. Diers Bros. & Co., 87 Colo. 67, 71; 285 P. 
165, 167. 
''When the defendant interposed the defense 
of a discharge in bankruptcy to defeat the judg-
ment of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff offered and 
proved that its claim was not properly scheduled, 
and for that reason did not receive the notice con-
templated by law, the burden was upon the de-
fendant who claimed the benefit of the discharge 
in bankruptcy to prove that the plaintiff had 
notice or actual kno,vledge of the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, and, upon the failure of the defendant 
so to do, the discharge was not a bar to the ju~g­
ment.'' 
It is, therefore, apparent that respondent has the 
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence 
that appellant A. E. Upton actually had notice of the 
bankruptcy proceedings as required by Section 35 of the 
Bankruptcy Act supra. 
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In order for a bankrupt debtor to avoid the penalty 
which comes from not properly scheduling a debt, he 
must show (1) that the creditor actually received a notice 
from the Bankruptcy Court or (2) that the creditor had 
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings. The 
trial court found as follows : 
"That shortly after the 16th day of November, 
1940, and before the first day of January, 1941, 
the plaintiff, A. E. Upton, received notice and 
actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceedings 
filed by the defendant, L. H. Heiselt; that the 
plaintiff, A. E. Upton, was represented by counsel, 
Raphael J. Moses, at the first meeting of creditors 
held on April 29, 1941; that the plaintiff, A. E. 
Upton, again received notice and actual knowledge 
of said bankruptcy proceedings in May and June 
of 1941; that he received notice and actual knowl-
edge of the said bankruptcy proceedings in ample 
time to avail himself of the benefits of the bank-
ruptcy law and in ample time to give him an equal 
opportunity with other creditors. (R. P. 71.) 
Plaintiff assigns as error this finding of the trial 
court on the grounds that it is contrary to the evidence, 
as there is no evidence to support the said finding. 
In the schedule of debts filed by the bankrupt debtor 
there appears $30.00 personal debt owing to A. E. Upton. 
(Ex. lA, P. 4). It was claimed by the defendant in the 
lower court, that because that debt was listed on the 
schedule by L. H. Heiselt, the bankrupt debtor, that A. E. 
Upton, the plaintiff herein, necessarily received notice 
from the court. There was no proof presented by de-
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fendant that a notice was sent to A. E. Upton. The 
alleged $30.00 debt was not scheduled properly. 
In regards to the requirement of sending out notices 
to creditors, the Bankruptcy Act provides: 
Sec. 75 (e), 11 U .S.C.A. Sec. 203 (e). 
''The conciliation commissioner shall promptly 
call the first meeting of creditors, stating in the 
notice that the farmer proposes to offer terms of 
composition or extension, and inclosing with the 
notice a summary of the inventory, a brief state-
ment of the farmer's indebtedness as shown by 
the schedules, and a list of the na.mes and ad-
dresses of the secured and unsecured creditors, 
with the amounts owing to each as shown by the 
schedules . . . '' (Italics ours.) 
Rafael J. Moses, a witness for the respondent was 
asked questions on direct examination concerning the 
$30.00 claim of A. E. U ptoD:. He testified as follows on 
pages 4 and 5 of his deposition: (Ex. 5A.) 
Q. Also in connection with your office files, I 
think there is some notation regarding this $30.00 
claim of A. E. Upton, is that true~ 
A. Yes, attached to the notice of first meeting 
of creditors which we received on November 21st, 
there is a t'vo-page statement entitled ''Inventory 
and List of Creditors''. In my handwriting, at 
the bottom of the list under item National City 
Bank, Denver, Colorado, liability by reason of 
endorsement of note of L. H. Heiselt, Inc., 
$11,000.00, I have written-''E. B. Upton, Alter & 
Upton, 710 Majestic Building, $30.00. '' And in 
the corner along the side of that notation are the 
initials "A. E." 
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Q. Do you recall the occasion for that nota-
tion or the reason for it~ 
A. It was made either one or two times. It 
was made either at the time of the conference in 
Denver or at the time of the first meeting of 
creditors, and I am inclined to believe it was the 
latter occasion because the same list of Inventory 
and List of Creditors has comments written as to 
each one, as to whether it was allowed and if, how 
much was allowed and I believe from that, that 
this came out in the first hearing; that this was 
one of the claims which ~lr. Heiselt was listing, 
but for some rea.son had not been copied on the 
first list which was attached to the notice of first 
meeting of creditors. I believe it was listed in his 
Schedules which were filed with the Petition in 
Bankruptcy. 
This clearly indicates that the $30.00 item must not 
have been on the schedule originally, otherwise it would 
have been on the list attached to the notice of the first 
meeting of creditors and furthermore, this proves con-
clusively that no notice of the first meeting of creditors 
was mailed to A. E. Upton, for the reason that notice 
would go only to those creditors whose names appeared 
on the list. 
The photostat copy of the schedule of debts in bank-
rupt (Ex. 1A, P. 4) shows that the typing in of the $30.00 
debt is different from the other typing. It no doubt was 
done at a later time. This lends weight to the testimony 
of Rafael J. Moses above cited that the $30.00 item was 
not on the list attached to the notice at the time the 
notice of the first meeting of creditors dated Nov. 16, 
1940 for the meeting to be held December 21, 1940. 
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This fully corroborates the testimony of A. E. Upton 
that he did not receive notice from the court, particularly 
the notice issued out of the court on November 16, 1940, 
which the trial court in its findings specifically found 
that he had received. As to the subsequent notices of 
First :Nleeting of Creditors of March 8 and 17, 1941, the 
record shows that A. E. Upton was away from his resi-
dence in Denver, Colorado and 'vould not have received 
notice from the court, if they were ever sent with respect 
to the $30.00 item, because his residence address was not 
set forth in the schedules as is more fully discussed 
hereafter. 
It is required that the correct address of the creditor 
be set out in the schedule. 6 Am. Jur., (Bankruptcy), 
Par. 381 sets out the rule as follows: 
''The reason for requiring an accurate state-
ment of the names of creditors applies with the 
same, if not greater, force to the statement of 
their residences. Notices sent by mail may not 
reach the creditors for ,~lhom they are intended, if 
their correct addresses are not given. The Bank-
ruptcy Act requires that the schedule, if known, 
and if unknown, that such fact be stated. The 
omission of the known address of a creditor ren-
ders the schedule insufficient and the debt is not 
discharged, unless the creditor had knowledge of 
the proceedings in time to participate with other 
creditors. 
'' * =r.< * It is also well settled that a debt is not 
duly scheduled if the bankrupt has listed the 
creditor's address incorrectly, at least not where 
the correct address can be ascertained. The ad-
40 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dress of a club at which the creditor does not 
reside is not a sufficient address. 
''The requirement for duly scheduling the 
names and residences of creditors is a most im-
portant one.'' 
Parker us. Murphy, 215 1\'lass. 72, 102 N. E. 85, 87. 
See also Van. Dinburgh vs. Goodfellow, et al., 1901 2d 
217, 120 P. 2d 20, 23; llfarlenee vs. Warkentin, 17 Calif. 
App. 177, 162 P. 2d 321, 327, also Bucci vs. La Rocca, 33 
A. 2d 878, 881 (infra p. 55). 
In the case of Marlowe v. Patt, 1950, 96 N. Y. Supp. 
2d 725, 726, the court held : 
''The schedules filed in bankruptcy proceed-
ings listed the judgments and judgment creditors, 
but neither as originally filed nor as later amended 
did they state the residence address of either 
creditor, nor the fact that such was unknown, as 
required by Act. 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 25 (8). A strict 
compliance with that requirement has been held 
essential to the debt's discharge. Horback v. Ar-
kell, 172 App. Div. 566, 158 N.Y.S. 842 ... " 
The residence address of A. E. Upton was known 
very well to L. H. Heisel t. They had been personally 
acquainted over a long period of time. 
The deposition of A. E. Upton was taken in Denver, 
Colorado. (Ex. 4A, P. 3, 4.) The following questions 
and answers were given: 
Q. I call your attention back to the year of 
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A·. 301 South 'Villiams Street, Denver, Colo-
rado. 
Q. Are you acquainted and were you ac-
quainted with L. H. Heiselt during his lifetimeY 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he is also known as Lawrence Hensen 
Heiselt ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was your first acquaintance with 
Mr. Heiselt; when did you first become acquainted 
with him~ Approximately. 
A. Well, I would say approximately 1912. 
Q. And you knew him and were acquainted 
with him prior to and after and during the years 
1940 and '41 ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know whether or not L. H. Heiselt 
was acquainted with your residence in Denver in 
1940 and '41 of 301 South Williams Street, Denver, 
Coloradof 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had he ever been at that house prior to 
1940~ 
· A. Yes. He and his wife were there with me 
for a "\veek in 1941, I think· it was. 
Q. But he was out there before 1940, was he~ 
A. Yes. 
It is apparent that A. E. Upton's residence address 
was known to L. H. Heiselt or should have been known 
or easily learned. The address given was c/o the Na-
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tional City Bank, Denver, Colorado. Claims are not 
properly scheduled if the residence address is not given 
when the residence address of the creditor ought to have 
been known by the debtor or could easily have been 
determined. Pa.rker v. Murphy, supra; Kreatlein v. Fer-
ger, 238 U. S. 21, 37. 
In view of the fact that A. E. Upton was in Cali-
fornia during the period of time the notice might have 
been sent out, it is highly improbable that the notice 
ever came to his attention. (Ex. 4A, 7, 8.) The receiving 
of the notice is denied by A. E. Upton. (Ex. 4A, P. 4, 
5, 6.) 
A. E. Upton testified on direct examination that he 
did not receive notice of the l\{eeting of Creditors held 
in .. AJamosa : 
Q. During the years of 1940 and 1941, did you 
receive any notice of a Meeting of Creditors before 
the Conciliatory Commissioner of Bankruptcy in 
Alamosa in the matter of bankruptcy proceedings 
of I.~. H. Heiselt before mentioned 1 
.A.. Not to my knowledge .. 
From the evidence produced, it cannot be said that 
the defendant has sustained the burden of proving that 
A. E. Upton received notice from the Bankruptcy Court. 
(b) He Did. Not Authorize Rafael J. Moses to Represent 
Him at the Creditors Meeting. 
It was claimed by the defendant in the court below 
that Rafael J. Moses, an attorney of Alamosa, Colorado, 
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entered an appearance for A. E. Upton at the first meet-
ing of the creditors of L. H. Heiselt held at Alamosa, 
Colorado, on lVIarch 29, 1941, pursuant to the notices of 
March 8, 1941, and March 17, 1941. (Ex. D, Sheet 6) . 
.. A_. E. Upton denies that he ever received a notice. 
The deposition of Rafael J. Moses was taken at 
Alamosa, Colorado. At page 3 of the deposition starting 
a little below the center of the page J\1:oses testified as 
follows in regard to questions propounded about the 
Creditors Meeting a.t Alamosa and the appearance 
entered: 
''I ha.ve no i.ndependent recollection of enter-
ing the appea.rance of the National City Barnk or 
A. E. Upton a.t the first meeting of creditors held 
on March 29, 1941; that our office records do show 
that on November 22, 1940, which would be two 
days after receipt of these notices, I made a. trip 
to Denver in connection with this matter, but I do 
recall having a meeting in the office of Alter and 
Upton with Mr. Ernest B. Upton. Our records 
show no payment of any fee by A. E. Upton or 
the National City Bank, and so far as the authority 
for entering the appearance of the National City 
Bank and A. E. Upton, I have no direct recollec-
tion." (Ex. 5A, P. 5, 6.) (Italics ours.) 
Mr. Moses had previously testified that he had de-
stroyed his correspondence file : 
Q. Were you ever personally authorized by 
Mr. A. E. Upton to represent him in the Bank~ 
ruptcy Proceedings of L. H. Heiselt of Alamosa 
in the years 1940 or 1941 ~ ' 
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A. I have no recollection of such authority. It 
is possible that in the correspondence file that was 
destroyed that such an authorization appeared, 
but I have no recollection of it at all. Remember 
this was fourteen years ago and my only contact 
was the conference in Denver, at the office of 
Alter & Upton. (Ex. 5A, P. 5, 6.) 
At page 4 of his deposition, Mr. Moses testified that 
the expense of the trip he took to Denver was charged 
to his client, the Union Central Life Insurance Company, 
which Company had a claim of $20,000.00 against the 
bankrupt, L. H. Heisel t. 
Although Mr. Moses testified that the trip was made 
for the purpose of seeing Mr. Ernest B. Upton, the 
lawyer brother of A. E. Upton, it would appear in view 
of the fact that the expense of the trip was charged to 
the Union Central Life Insurance Company, his client, 
that the trip to Denver must have been on behalf of the 
Union Central Life Insurance Company to justify charg-
ing that company for the expense of the trip. 
During the cross-examination of Rafael J. Moses as 
to who authorized him to appear for A. E. Upton, the 
following questions were propounded and answered : 
(Deposition of Rafael J. Moses, Ex. 5A, P. 8.) 
Q. But you do state that A. E. Upton never 
personally authorized you and if you had any it 
was through Ernest~ 
A. That is my belief. 
The Ernest referred to above 1s Ernest Upton, a 
brother of A. E. Upton, whose deposition was also taken. 
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Further inquiring into the alleged authorization re-
ceived by Rafael J. Moses, he was asked the following 
questions concerning the destroyed correspondence file, 
and he gave the following answers on redirect exami-
nation: 
Q. ~fr. Roberts: Do you have any recollection 
of the contents of the correspondence file' 
A. No, sir. 
Q. And my understanding of your testimony 
is that you base your appearance for A. E. Upton 
on the contents of that file~ 
A. It is possible, I have no recollection, but 
it is possible. It might have been. 
Q. Do you have any recollection of any cor· 
respondence in this file~ 
A. Oh, I know it contained voluminous corres· 
pondence with Union Central Life Insurance Com-
pany. 
Q. And A. E. Upton or Alter & Upton? 
A. I couldn't say. 
Q. That is all. 
Rafael J. Moses, also testified that he had never met 
A. E. Upton. He gave the following answers to questions 
propounded: 
Q. Mr. Moses, I want to be sure you dis-
tinguish between A. E. Upton and Ernest B. 
Upton. Now, Ernest B. is the attorney-at-law, 
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Q. Now, have you ever met Mr. A. E. Upton 1 
A. I don't believe so. I don't recall his being 
present at the meeting in Denver. 
Q. You don't ever remember having met him 1 
A. No, I have no recollection of meeting him. 
Q. Were you ever personally authorized by 
~fr. A. E. Upton to represent him in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding of L. H. Heiselt in Alamosa, in 
the years of 1940 or 19411 
A. I have no recollection of any such author-· 
ity. It is possible that in this correspondence file 
that was destroyed that such an authorization 
appeared, but I have no recollection of it at all. 
Remember this was fourteen years ago and my 
only contact was this conference in Denver at the 
office of Alter & Upton. 
It is submitted that Rafael J. Moses, having no inde-
pendent recollection of the matter and having destroyed 
his correspondence files in which he says there might 
have been some authorization, did not testify with that 
degree of certainty necessary to convince one that he did 
have authority to enter the appearance of A. E. Upton. 
We must now consider the testimony of A. E. Upton 
and Attorney Ernest B. Upton on the question as to 
whether or not Rafael Moses was ever authorized to 
represent A. E. Upton at the Creditors' Meeting. A. E. 
Upton testified as follows: (Ex. 4A, P. 6, 7.) 
Q. Are you acquainted with one Raphael J. 
Moses, an attorney at law, whose office is in 
Alamosa, Colorado 1 
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A. Is that Senior or Junior? 
Q. Raphael J. Moses, his son, or a Moses who 
was an attorney in Alamosa~ · 
A. No, I have no recollection of ever having 
met him. 
Q. I don't recall the first name of Judge Moses 
but Raphael J. Moses is the son of former Judge 
Moses of Alamosa. 
Did you ever authorize Raphael J. Moses to 
represent you in bankruptcy proceedings insti-
tuted by L. H. Heiselt in the Bankruptcy Court of 
the District Court of the United States for the 
State of Colorado during the years 1940 or 1941 ~ 
A. No, nor any other years. 
Q. He never represented you~ 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever spoken to Raphael J. Moses~ 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Do you know him~ 
A. I don't know him to my knowledge ; I don't 
think I have ever seen the gentleman. 
Attorney Ernest Upton testified on deposition a.t the 
instance of defendant hereon. On direct examination, he 
testified as follo,vs: (Ex. 6A, P. 9, 10, 11.) 
Q. Do you know Raphael Moses~ 
A. I would know him if I should see him, I 
assume. I know that I've seen him once and he 
' says he saw me once here in Denver. 
Q. Do you recall seeing him here in Denver~ 
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A. No, I don't recall anything about that. I 
knew his father, Albert ~loses, between 1909 and 
1913. I met him here in Denver in the office where 
I was located at the time but I hadn't seen him 
for many years and after this hearing in bank-
ruptcy there I went around to the office to see him 
and he wasn't there but Raphael was there, and 
that's the only time I actually remember of seeing 
him. 
Q. I notice that in the proceedings of the 
bankruptcy of Lawrence Hensen Heiselt it ap-
pears that Mr. Raphael J. Moses appeared in 
behalf of the N a.tional City Bank at that first 
meeting of creditors; did you have any commu-
nication with Mr. Moses in connection with that 
appearance~ 
A. Not that I remember. 
Q. I notice that he also appeared for ~fr. A. E. 
Upton, did you have any-do you recall any com-
munication you made with Mr. Moses concerning 
that~ 
A. I don't recall any. 
Q. Did you take any steps to have the bank 
represented at the first meeting of the creditors~ 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Did you discuss with anyone at the bank 
having anybody make an appearance~ 
A. I don't recall that. I can't tell you all 
those details, Mr. Roberts. 
Q. Would you say that you did not communi-
cate with anyone in Alamosa for the purpose of 
having representation during that time~ 
A. Yes, I would say that I never had any com-
munication with anybody. If you are talking about 
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representation of A. E., I never-I had nothing 
to do "\vith it as far a.s he 'vas concerned. I was 
only interested in the bank angle. 
Q. Other than the fact you did inform him 
'vhen you got the list of creditors that his name 
was on the list~ 
A. I informed the bank and gave them a list. 
Q. You informed Mr. Upton that he was on 
there for $30 f 
A. I probably did, but whether I did or not I 
won't say because I don't remember and I never 
represented him in the matter of filing any claims. 
Q. Do you have any idea how it is that Mr. 
Moses appeared in behalf of either the bank or 
Mr. Upton u? 
A. I haven't the slightest idea, Mr. Roberts, 
how it happened. 
Q. Have you made any search of the bank 
records to determine whether or not authority 
'vas given~ 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. Ordinarily, would the bank records reflect 
that fact~ 
A. No reason for it. 
l\tiR. ROBERTS : That's all. 
Certainly the defendant did not sho"r by the testi-
mony of the "!itnesses in this case, that A. E. Upton or 
that anyone authorized by A. E. Upton, gave authority 
to Rafael J. Moses to enter an appearance for him a.t the 
Meeting of Creditors held in Alamosa, Colorado, on 
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March 29, 1941, or at any other time. Unless the defend-
ant sustained the burden of proof in respect to this 
point, it cannot be said that A. E. Upton received notice 
of the proceedings in bankruptcy by reason of the alleged 
entry of appearance claimed to have been made by 
Rafael Moses. 
(c) A. E. Upton Did Not Receive Actual Knowledge of 
the Bankruptcy Proceedings_ From Any Source in 
T~me in Which to Perfect His Claim. 
It has been shown that A. E. Upton did not receive 
a notice from the Bankruptcy Court, and that he should 
not be charged with the appearance of Rafael J. Moses 
at the meeting of c~editors for the reason that such ap-
pearance was unauthorized, and that the entry of appear-
ance was no doubt a clerical error. There is no positive 
evidence that A. E. Upton had "actual knowledge of the 
bankruptcy proceedings'' in time within which to file his 
claim assuming it was a provable debt. 
We must next ask the question, how much time did 
A. E. Upton have within which to obtain "notice or 
.actual knowledge'' of the bankruptcy proceedings and 
file his claim 1 The statute is clear. 
Sec. 57 ( n) of the Barnkruptcy Act, 11 U. S. C. A., 
Par. 93 (n) : 
'' . . Claims which are not filed within six 
months after the first date set for the first meeting 
of creditors shall not be allowed ... '' 
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The court in Re Dunn, D. C. Wash. 1941, 38 Fed. 
Supp. 1017, 1018, 47 Am,. Bankr. Rep. N. S. 186, in dis-
cussing the effect of the statute said: 
''Under the Chandler Act, however, it is clear 
that the Court has no authority to allow any 
claims which are not filed within six months after 
the date set for the first meeting of creditors. 
"In the recent opinion of United States Dis-
trict Judge Caillouet in Re Quine, D. C., 38 F. 
Supp. 869, filed Jan. 27, 1941, it is said: 
'The present petitioner is barred by Section 
57 (n) of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended (11 
U.S.C.A. Sec. 93 sub. n), from now filing and pre~ 
senting his alleged claim, granting that his peti-
tion otherwise makes out a case, in the discretion 
of the Court, for the re-opening of the bankruptcy 
proceedings. 
'The statute specifying the time for filing 
claims in bankruptcy is prohibitive, and gives the 
Court no discretionary power to extend the 
time.' '' 
In Re Quine, D. C. La. 1941, 38 Fed. Supp. 869, 870, 
the court said : 
''Even though a creditor had no notice or 
knowledge of the proceedings during the time 
allowed by law for the proving of claims, and the 
estate is still undistributed, he may not prove his 
debt after the lapse of such period. In Re Muskoka 
Lumber Company, D. C. W. D. New York 1904, 
127 Fed. 886. '' 
In Re W a.gner, D. C. Minn., 1946, 64 Fed. Supp. 481, 
483, the court said : 
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'' The proceedings under Section 7 5, and the 
Court's jurisdiction over them, are commenced 
by the filing of the original petition provided for 
in Subsection c and n. 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 203, subs. 
c. n; Kolb v. Fuerstein 1938, 308 U. S. 433, 60 S. 
Ct. 343; 84 L. Ed. 370 ... " 
The farmer-debtor, L. H. Heiselt, filed his original 
petition in bankruptcy under Section 75 on October 21, 
1940. (Ex. 4, P. 2.) On November 16, 1940, there was 
issued the 'Notice of First Meeting of Creditors' setting 
the first date of the first meeting of creditors as Decem-
ber 21, 1940. (Ex. D, Sheet 4.) Therefore, June 21, 1941, 
was the date of the six months limitation mentioned in 
Section 57 (n) of the Bankruptcy Act in which creditors 
might have filed and proven their claims in t~e L. H. 
Heiselt proceeding. 
The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A., Sec. 35 supra re-
quires that the bankrupt who seeks to show that a debt 
has been discharged even though it had not been sched-
uled, must do so by proving that the creditor ''had notice 
or actual knowledge'' of the bankruptcy proceedings. 
On the point as to the nature of the ''notice or actual 
knowiedge'' required to be had by a creditor the New 
York court said in Wheeler vs. Newton., (1915) 154 N. Y. 
S. 431, 168 App. Div. 782, affirmed 220 N. Y. 607, 115 
N. E. 1053: 
'' ... While it is true that the 'vord ''actual'' 
does not usually advance the meaning, it must be 
understood in the connection used in the statute 
under consideration to emphasize the fact that 
53 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
kno,vledge of the party must be actual as c_ontra-
distinguished from construcf'ive or speculat~ve. It 
must be something existing in fact. 1 Am. & Eng. 
Ency. of Law, 601. The statute requires that the 
plaintiff should have 'had notice or actual knowl-
edge', and the rule is well-established that where 
a statute requires notice to be given, and there is 
nothing in the context of the statute, or in the cir-
cumstances of the case, to show that any other 
notice~as intended, a personal notice must always 
be given. Beakes v. Da Cunha, 126 N.Y. 293, 297; 
27 N. E. 251. It must follow, therefore, that when 
the statute here under consideration required 
'notice or actual knowledge,' it contemplated a 
personal notice, or' knowledge of the proceedings 
in Bankruptcy' equivalent to such personal notice. 
In other words, that great underlying principle 
of our law, that no one shall be deprived of his 
property without due process of law, is present 
in this statute, and it requires such personal 
notice of the proceedings, or actual kno,vledge 
equivalent to such personal notice, as would be 
required in any court where it was proposed to 
deprive a man of his property. 
''The proof and the findings here go no fur-
ther than to sho'v that the plaintiff was told by a 
stranger to the proceeding that the defendant 
Newton had gone into bankruptcy. But the fact 
that one's debtor has gone into bankruptcy is not 
notice or knowledge of 'the proceedings in Bank-
ruptcy'. It does not impose the duty upon the 
creditor to taking active steps. He has a right to 
rely upon the provisions of the statute that he 
shall ha,ve notice or actual knowledge of the pro-
ceedings; he has a right _to assume ·that no sub-
stantial right will be taken from him without his 
~a.ving an_opportunity for contesting the question 
1n the ordinary way-that the bankrupt will com-
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ply with the conditions of the statute necessary 
for his own relief. In Morrison v. Vaughan, 119 
App. Div. 184; 104 N. Y. Supp. 169, the plaintiff 
had notice of the bankruptcy through reading of 
it in ne,vspapers, and subsequently the defendant 
and his clerk verbally conveyed the information 
to the plaintiff, while yet there was time to inter-
vene in the proceeding, and the First Department 
(~Ir. Justice Laughlin dissenting) held that the 
plaintiff had such actual knowledge as to come 
'vithin the provisions of the statute. This is clearly 
carrying the rule to -its limit, and does not justify 
this court in holding that a mere casual conversa-
tion with a disinterested person, in which the 
plaintiff is told that the defendant has gone into 
bankruptcy, is such 'notice or-actual knowledge of 
the proceedings in bankruptcy' as to entitle the 
defendant to be discharged of the obligation of an 
unscheduled and provable debt.'' (Italics ours.) 
In Bucci v. LaRocca, New Jersey (1943), 33 A. 2d 
878, 882, 21 N. J. Misc. 316, 55 Am. Bkr. Rep. N. S. 1, 
the court said : 
''After proof of lack of due scheduling has 
been met, the burden is upon the bankrupt to show 
actual knowledge or notice of the bankruptcy on 
the creditor's part. Remington on Bankruptcy, 
Volume 7, 5th Edition, Articles 3578, 843; Hill v. 
Smith, Supreme Court 1923, 260 U. S. 592, 43 S. 
Ct. 219, 67 L. Ed. 419; 8 C.J.S. Bankruptcy, Sec. 
586 subsec. b, p. 1585. And further enunciated in 
Birkett v. Columbia Bank, Supreme Court, 1904, 
195 U. S. 345, 25 S. Ct. 38, 40 ; 49 L. Ed. 231, 
wherein the matter of time of actual knowledge 
was under review. This pertinent comment was 
made: 'Actual knowledge of the proceedings, 
contemplated by the section, is a knowledge in 
time to avail a creditor of the benefits of the law, 
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-in time to give him an equal opportunity with 
other creditors, -not a knowledge that m~y come 
so late as to deprive him of a participation in the 
administration of the affairs of the estate, or to 
deprive him of dividends (Sec. 65). The provi-
sions of the law relied upon by plaintiff in error 
are for the benefit of the creditors, not of the 
debtor. That the law should give a creditor reme-
dies against the estate of a bankrupt, not with-
standing the neglect of the bankrupt, is natural. 
The law would be, indeed, defective without them. 
It would also be defective if it permitted the bank-
rupt to experiment with it, -to so manage and 
use its provisions as to conceal his estate, deceive 
or keep his creditors in ignorance of his proceed-
ings, without penalty to him. It is easy to see 
what results such looseness would permit, -what 
preference could be accomplished and covered 
by it." 
"Also refer to Feld Lumber Co. v. Bornstien, 
Supreme Court, 1937, 118 N. J. L. 357 at page ~58, 
192 A. 738. '' 
We must inquire as to what opportunity A. E. Upton 
had to learn of the bankruptcy proceedings. He testified 
that he was in Palo ·Alto, California, from the first part 
of January to the last part of May, 1941. Certainly he 
would not have the opportunity to learn of the bankruptcy 
proceedings while in California. In any event, there is 
no evidence that A. E. Upton learned of the bankruptcy 
while he was away from Denver. The fact that he was 
away is not in dispute. 
Q. I call your attention to the period of time 
beginning the first part of the year 1941, in J anu-
ary, and up to and until about the 1st of June or 
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the 28th of May, 1941, do you recall where you 
were~ 
A. I do. 
Q. Where were you~ 
A. In Palo Alto, California. 
Q. When did you leave Denver to go to Palo 
Alto-about? 
A. I would say about in the month of January. 
Q. What year~ 
A. 1941. 
Q. And you stayed in Palo Alto until when 1 
A. To the best of my knowledge and belief, I 
remained there until just in time to get back here 
by the 1st of May. 
Q. May? 
A. Yes -wait a minute -no, no; I just can't 
give the date; I know that I was in Denver the 
28th of May. I have definite knowledge of that by 
reason of having issued a check here to send out 
there for $225. to my wife. 
Q. And you left in January of 1941 and re-
turned sometime the latter part of May, 1941' 
A. Yes. (Ex. 4A, P. 7, 8.) 
A. E. Upton testified that he first became aware that 
L. H. Heiselt had filed bankruptcy proceedings after the 
year 1941. (Ex. 4A, P. 7, 8.) The defendant, in order to 
prevail, must prove by the evidence that A. E. Upton 
gained "actual knowledge of the proceedings in bank-
ruptcy'' between the time he returned to Denver in the 
latter part of May, 1941, and .June 21, 1941. The burden 
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of p1•o.of is on the defendant and is not on A. E.· Upton 
to disprove notice. On cross-examination by Mr. Roberts, 
attorney for defendant, A. E. Upton testified a~ follows: 
Q. Now, in 1940 and '41 Mr. Heiselt was obli-
gated to National City Bank in the sum of, oh, 
in round figures, $12,500 ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You talked with him about the payment 
of that, did you not~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he was delinquent on the payments 
that he agreed to make on that loan? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you talked with him up until the time 
you say you left for Palo Alto in January of '41 T 
A. Yes. 
Q. He talked to you about the fact that he 
figured he would have to take out bankruptcy, 
didn't he~ 
A. I don't think anything of the kind was 
discussed at that time-not to my recollection. 
Q. And did you go down to Alamosa in con-
nection with this matter~ 
A. This particular matter? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
Q. Were you down in Alamosa in 1940 to see 
Mr. Heiselt ~ 
A. I can't- I can't answer that. I might have 
been there and I might not; I just don't know. 
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Q. When you left here to go to Palo Alto you 
turned over these affairs that you were handling 
in the bank to someone, didn't you, to take care of 1 
A. Yes. My brother \vas vice president of the 
bank and attorney for the bank, and whenever I 
wasn't here he looked after those things. 
Q. And any personal matters you also per-
mitted him to handle, did you not~ 
A. No. I had no occasion to. 
Q. Did he ever handle any personal legal 
matters for you~ 
A. Between Mr. Heiselt and me 1 
Q. No. Any~ 
A. Well, I can't answer that because I can't 
recall any that I had that it would be necessary 
to do that at that time. 
Q. Was he your personal attorney during that 
period of time, 1940 and '411 
A. Well, in a sense he has been my principal 
attorney ever since he has been practicing law in 
Denver. 
Q. And it was agreeable with you that he 
handle any of your personal matters that came 
up, for instance, while you were gone to Palo Alto~ 
A. He wouldn't handle any of my personal 
matters without first communicating with me. 
Q. Well, would it be agreeable with you that 
he do it~ 
A. How is that~ 
Q. Would it be agreeable with you that he 
do it 1 As they came up. 
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A. I can't answer that because it would de-
pend entirely upon what the matter was. 
Q. Now, did you learn of the fact that the 
bank had to present a claim to the bankruptcy 
court. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that matter was discussed with you! 
A. No. 
Q. Just a minute. Before it was :filed, wasn't 
. t OJ 1 . 
A. No. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Could it have been~ 
A. Well- yes; I would say, yes, it could have 
been but I wasn't here at that time. 
Q. You say you came back sometime in May! 
A. Sometime in May. 
Q. Of 1941 ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. When you came back.you, of course, again 
talked over the things you had been handling for 
the bank before you left~ 
A. There was nothing to talk over in the 
matter of the Heiselt case because that was settled 
while I was gone. It was filed in bankruptcy court, 
as I recall. 
Q. And you learned about that when you got 
back~ 
A. Yes. 
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A. Well, if there was any discussion about it, 
I would say it would be E. B. Upton. 
Q. So, one of the things you learned about 
was the fact that this claim had been presented 
on behalf of the National City Bank in Mr. Hei-
selt 's bankruptcy matter 1 
A. N o,v, I don't know just what the proceed-
ings were. All I kno"\\7 about that is, my brother 
and the cashier of the bank-my brother was vice 
president, understand-he and the cashier of the 
bank went down to Alamosa in connection with 
that matter. Just what they did, I don't know; 
I couldn't tell you. 
Q. But when you returned here from Palo 
Alto they discussed that matter with you and 
told you about it 1 
A. There was no discussion about it; there 
was no occasion for discussion. 
Q. Well, they told you about it~ 
A. They told me what they had done. 
Q. That they had gone down to Alamosa to 
check into this bankruptcy rna tter of Mr. Heiselt 's 
and to present this claim 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they told you that immediately upon 
your return 1 
A. No, I wouldn't say immediately. They may 
have told me the first day I was here and they 
may not have told me for a month. 
Q. But it would be within a month after your 
return 1 
A. Not necessarily. It would be if the occa-
sion arose for the matter to be brought up. 
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Defendant did not show by the testimony of A. E. 
Upton that he had'' actual knowledge of the proceedings 
in bankruptcy" prior to June 21, 1941. The fact that 
knowledge was gained after 1941, does not relieve the 
defendant of the penalty imposed by the failure of L. H. 
Heiselt to properly schedule his obligation to A. E. Upton. 
Ernest B. Upton, the lawyer brother of the plaintiff, 
A. E. Upton, testified by deposition on behalf of the 
defendant on direct 'examination as follows in answer to 
the question as to whether or not he, Ernest B. Upton, 
was ever consulted with by his brother, A. E. Upton, 
concerning the personal o bliga.tions owing the .latter by 
L. H. Heiselt: 
Q. Particula.rly relating to the time during 
1940 and '41 were you consulted by your brother 
concerning o bliga.tions owed to the bank, the 
National City Bank, by Heiselt Construction Com-
pany or L. H. Heiselt ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And were you ever consulted by him in 
connection 'vith any personal obligations which 
they owed to him personally rather than to the 
bank~ 
A. No. Let me add here: I was an officer, 
sto.ckholder and officer, in the National City Bank 
also, so I was as much interested as anyone else 
in the bank, understand. (Ex. 6A, P. 3.) 
Ernest B. Upton, at no time during the taking of his 
deposition, gave testimony to the effect that A. E. Upton 
had" actu.al knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy" 
before Jun.e 21, 1941. Again we must emphasize that the 
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burden of proof is on the defendant to show that plaintiff 
had actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy 
prior to June 21, 1941, if defendant is to successfully 
raise the bar of the discharge in bankruptcy to defeat 
the plaintiff from recovering on the judgment in this 
case. Counsel for the defendant interrogated Ernest B. 
Upton, defendant's own 'vitness, relative to when A. E. 
Upton first gained kno,vledge of the proceedings. Ernest 
B. Upton testified that he did tell A. E. Upton that he 
saw the $30.00 debt listed on the schedule, but at no time 
did he testify as to any dates when he discussed the 
matter with him nor did he place the date before June 
21, 1941. This is fatal to the claim of the defendant that 
A. E. Upton knew of the proceedings. "Actual knowledge 
of the proceedings in bankrtttptcy'' does not mean infor-
mation gained from a casual conversation or observation. 
Wheeler vs. Newton, supra. At page 14 in his deposition 
the following question was asked A. E. Upton by counsel 
for the defendant : 
Q. When you called to Mr. A. E. Upton's at-
tention the scheduling of his debt, what did he 
say1 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Are you talking about 
the $301 
MR. ROBERTS: The $30 debt, yes. 
A. What he actually did say, it was something 
more or less to the effect that it was a joke. He 
said, ''He owes me a lot more than that.'' 
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A. No, I don't. I won't attempt to fix any 
dates 13 or 14 years ago unless I have something 
on which I can set it. 
At the bottom of page 16 of the deposition, the testi-
mony is as follows : 
Q. Is it your recollection that it was shortly 
after he got back that the matter of Heiselt was 
discussed with him~ The proceedings in Alamosa. 
A. I haven't said they were discussed. They 
would be reported to him - approval of the claim 
and the amount would be reported, and of course 
Mr. Land, who was with me and the witness, had 
with him the bank record and knew it all and 
was there all the time-probably he told A. E. 
before I did. 
Q. But you recall telling him? 
A. No. 
Q. You recall reporting it at a board of 
directors meeting~ 
A. l wouldn't say I reported it; I would say 
it was discussed there. It, naturally, would be. 
Q. And in the presence of l\1r. A. E. Upton! 
A. He was there, yes. 
MR. ROBERTS: That's all. 
THE WITNESS : If you're trying to get me 
to tell about any bank meetings 13 to 15 years ago, 
you know I can't remember them. 
MR. ROBERTS: No, I don't sir. Sometimes 
we do, you know. Or, in any event in the ordi-
nary routine of things we can say they were . 
. TH~ WITNESS: In the ordinary routine of 
things It would be discussed at a meeting and a 
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thing like this would be called up but there 
wouldn't be anything to discuss after it was re-
ported, if you speak of the first report. Every-
body kne'v the claim was allowed ; there wasn't 
anything to do for the time being. 
Q. (By ~Ir. Roberts) Would any progress 
reports be made as to what happened- some 
watch kept of the thing1 
A. Very little. 
Q. But there would be some, even though very 
little~ 
A. It might be mentioned at meetings. You 
couldn't tell what might occasion it. Bankruptcies 
run a long time and there isn't anything you can 
do beyond proving your claim. 
There 'vas no testimony given as to when the Board 
of Directors' meeting was held at which the bankruptcy 
was reported. Certainly there is no evidence that it was 
held before June 21, 1941. 
It is very noticeable upon examination of the depo-
sitions of A. E. Upton and Ernest B. Upton that counsel 
for the defendant did not ask questions which might have 
been asked to definitely determine the time when certain 
claimed conversations took place or to determine the time 
when the Board of Directors' meetings were held at 
which the bankruptcy proceedings were discussed. The 
Board of Directors' meeting at which the bankruptcy 
proceedings were discussed might very likely have been 
held many months after June 21, 1941. Any conclusion 
as to the time when any of these events occurred must 
be reached by supposition and speculation. A creditor's 
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claim should not be defeated in a situation such as this 
where one must speeulate and guess and read into the 
testimony things that are not there in order to come to 
the conclusion that the creditor in this case had "actual 
knowledge of the ptoceedings in bankruptcy," prior to 
June 21, 1941. 
In summary of this point may we say that the 
failure on the part of L. H. Heiselt to schedule his obli-
gation to A. E. Upton under the particular circumstances 
of this case, should prevent the defendant from avoiding 
the obligation of paying off the judgment involved in 
this case. In addition, thereto, it is clear that the evidence 
does not sustain the finding of the trial court. There is 
no evidence that A. E. Upton received a notice from the 
Bankruptcy Court. Certainly the defendant .did not sus-
tain the burden of proof in connection with the entry of 
appearance made by Rafael J. Moses. Rafael J. Moses 
admitted he did not get the authorization of A. E. Upton. 
Ernest B. Upton, the defendant's own witness, denied 
having given him authorization. At no place in their 
depositions did A. E. Upton or Ernest B. Upton give 
testimony sho,ving that A. E. Upton gained ''actual 
knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy" "rithin time 
in which to perfect his claim, before June 21, 1941. 
D. THE DEBT UPON WHICH THE JUDGMENT IS 
BASED WAS NOT A PROVABLE DEBT IN 
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Plaintiff contends that the debt 'vhich is the basis 
of the judgment in the case at bar \vas not a provable 
debt against L. H. Heiselt personally at the time he filed 
his original petition in bankruptcy, so as to allow the 
creditor to file the claim and make proof thereof in 
bankruptcy. The debt was too contingent to require 
scheduling or filing by a creditor. The mortgagor in the 
mortgage and the principal maker in the note is Heiselt 
Construction Company, one of the defendants, and the 
bankrupt debtor, L-. H. Heiselt another defendant, is an 
endorser on the said note. At the time of the filing of 
the petition in bankruptcy the creditor, A. E. Upton, had 
not exhausted his remedies against the mortgagor and 
the principal maker of the note. Even if the creditor, 
A. E. Upton, had had notice of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings in time to file and prove this debt, it is submitted 
that he could not have filed and proved and had allowed 
in the Bankruptcy Court the claim against the bankrupt 
debtor as a surety on the note which was secured by the 
mortgage of the Heiselt Construction Company. If one 
assumes that he had had notice and had filed or sched-
uled the claim in the Bankruptcy Court, the Bankruptcy 
Court no doubt would have ruled that it was too con-
tingent and not a provable debt at that time against the 
bankrupt, L. H. Heiselt, because the remedies against 
the mortgagor and principal maker on foreclosure of 
the mortgage was necessary to the accruing of any debt 
thereunder against the bankrupt, L. H. Heiselt. rrhe fact 
is that A. E. Upton in the case at bar filed the action to 
foreclose the mortgage and the Heiselt Construction 
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Company pleaded the Statute of Limitations to defeat 
the claim- against it and "\vhen that decision was made 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and· for the State 
of Utah, the liability against the surety L. H. Heiselt, 
was then first determined and the exact amount thereof 
was then, and not until then, definite, due and payable 
by the surety ·L. H. Heiselt, the bankrupt debtor. It is 
to be noted from the schedules in bankruptcy placed in 
evidence in this matter, (Ex~ lA) that L. H. Heiselt 
owned all of the shares of the Heiselt Construction Com-
pany, except two qualifying shares and that, therefore, 
it was in L. H. Heiselt 's power to a,nd L. H. Heiselt did 
plead the Statute of !..~imitations for the Heiselt Con-
struction Company so as to bar the recovery against the 
Heiselt Construction Company and bring into being this 
liability against himself personally as a surety on the 
debt of the judgment issuing out of the Third Judicial 
District Court of the State of Utah, herein, on the 7th 
day of June, 1948. L. H. Heiselt could, in this matter 
if he had so de~ired, allowed the foreclosure proceedings 
to go ·w·ithout the pleading of the Statute of Limitations 
on behalf of the Heiselt Construction Company and the 
plaintiff, A. E. Upton, then would have realized on the 
debt through the ordinary course of the foreclosure on 
the real estate. 
Attention of the court is directed to the fact that 
this is not a case of endorser on an unsecured note, but 
is a. case where there is a note secured by a real estate 
mortgage and the bankrupt debtor in this c~se is a 
surety on such a secured obligation. 
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In Re Lehrenkrauss, 14 Fed. Supp. 682, 684, 685, the 
court held: 
'' . . . As to that the court said : ''The engage-
ment of Merrill and Baker was a guaranty. It 
was not a contract to pay at all events, but a 
contract that Brainard & Co. (the subsidiary) 
could pay, and pay what 1 Not necessarily the 
full amount of the debt, but any deficiency arising 
from the sale of the collateral (which had been 
posted by the subsidiary). Brainard & Co. were 
not called upon to pay until demand had been 
made, and I perceive but one answer to the in-
quiry - could any action have been maintained 
on the contract against Merrill & Baker on the 
day of bankruptcy~ Such action would clearly 
have been premature. If that action was pre-
mature, then no provable claim existed. On this 
subject there is nothing to add to the review of 
the _cases contained in Re: Inman (D. C.) 171 
Fed. 185 ... 
''The opinion says : 'It cannot be contended 
that the bankrupt's contract to idemnify had re-
opened or become absolute at the time he filed his 
petition.' '' 
The court's attention is called to the fact that the 
bankrupt, L. H. Heiselt, petitioned the Bankruptcy Court 
in October of 1947, to hear this matter in that court and 
the fact that that court decided that it was a matter for 
the State Court corroborates the contention that it was 
not a provable debt in bankruptcy. 
In Peterson v. Johnson Nut Company, (1939) 283 N. 
W. 561, 204 Minn. 300, the court held that, ''So long as 
it remains uncertain whether contract or liability will 
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ever give rise to actual duty of liability, and there is no 
means of removing uncertainty by calculation, the claim 
is too conti~gent to be provable as a 'debt' in bank-
ruptcy.'' 
Therefore, it is submitted that under the circum-
stances of a case where there is a real estate mortgage 
and note \Vherein the mortgagor and principal maker was 
not the bankrupt and the bankrupt was the endorser of 
the note, it is too contingent· to be a provable debt 
against the bankrupt, L. H. Heiselt at the time of the 
filing of his petition in bankruptcy and that, therefore, 
the discharge in bankruptcy of the defendant herein, 
L·. H. Heiselt, did not and does not include the debt which 
. is the basis of the judgment that was issued out of the 
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah and 
was affirmed by this court on this matter on the 7th day 
of J nne, 1948. 
CONCLUSION 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted: 
First: That the lo,ver court. herein should have 
recognized that the jurisdiction of the County Court of 
Conejos County, State of Colorado, in the matter of the 
Estate of L. H. Heiselt, deceased, had attached in all 
respects as to the matters herein at issue and that that 
probate court was a competent court to decide the 
rna tter; and that, therefore, the lower court in this case 
should have dismissed the substituted defendant's motion 
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for a stay of execution upon grounds of conflicting juris-
diction. 
Second: That the lower court should have ruled that 
the matter had been fully adjudicated at the instance of 
the defendant (bankrupt debtor) on at least two occa-
sions in the United States District Court for the State 
of Colorado, in bankruptcy; and upon such grounds 
should have disallowed the substituted defendant's 
motion to stay execution. The lower court failed to recog-
nize that the _Bankruptcy Court had its entire file at its 
disposal with respect to ''notice or actual knowledge'' 
of any creditor and on two occasions at the instance of 
the defendant (bankrupt debtor) herein ruled contrary 
to him with respect to the controversy. 
Third: The lower court erred in finding, from the 
evidence, that the plaintiff, A. E. Upton, had received 
"notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings" in time to file his claim. The defendant had the 
burden of showing positively that the plaintiff had 
"notice or actual knowledge of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings'' and failed to do so. If there is any question under 
the evidence presented by a debtor interposing a tech-
nical bar, the question should be resolved in favor of the 
creditor. The lower court erred in that it apparently 
allowed supposition and speculation to influence its find-
Ings. 
Fourth: That the lower court should have found that 
the debt upon which the judgment herein is based was, 
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at the time of the institution of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings, too contingent to be provable, especially where, as 
in this case, the bankrupt is an endorser on a note that 
is secured by a mortgage on real estate. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the decision of the 
lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WM. J. CHRISTENSEN 
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